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CHAPTER 15 
Education Law 
SANDRA L. LYNCH* 
§ 15.1. Introduction. School desegregation, the crucible for racial 
equality in our nation, generated much heat, some light, and con-
tinued hope for improvement in the Boston schools during the Survey 
year. While the Boston schools underwent the transition to a unitary 
school system, Springfield peacefully integrated its elementary schools. 
Throughout the Commonwealth, the special education system was 
subjected to a far reaching transformation as a new special education 
law, chapter 766 of the Acts of 1972,1 went into effect. 2 These, and 
other steps surveyed here, marked the beginnings of meaningful al-
terations in the state's educational system. In evaluating these begin-
nings, it is true as Justice Frankfurter once stated, that "[o]nly the 
constructive use of time will achieve what an advanced civilization 
demands and the Constitution confirms."3 
A. DESEGREGATION 
§15.2. Overview. On June 21, 1974, United States District Court 
Judge W. Arthur Garrity, Jr. held that the Boston School Committee 
and the Superintendent of Schools had violated the constitutional 
rights of black students by purposefully creating and maintaining a 
segregated school system. 1 As interim relief for the first year of de-
segregation, the federal district court adopted the racial balance plan 
ordered implemented as a matter of state law by the Supreme Judicial 
Court.2 Thus began the struggle between the parties over the proper 
*SANDRA L. LYNCH is the General Counsel to the Massachusetts Department of Educa-
tion. 
§15.1. 1 G.L. c. 71B, §§ 1-14. 
2 Acts of 1972, c. 766 went into effect on September 1, 1974. I d. § 23. 
3 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 25 (1958) (Frankfurter,]., concurring). 
§15.2. 1 Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass.), affd sub nom. Morgan v. 
Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (lst Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975) [hereinafter 
cited as Morgan]. 
2 Partial Judgment and Interlocutory Order, Morgan v. Henningan, 379 F. Supp. at 
484. See School Comm. v. Board of Educ., 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1315, 302 N.E.2d 916 
(Boston III). 
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remedy for the violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. In the 
face of continued resistance by the School Committee defendants to 
the remedies it ordered, the federal court fashioned a second phase 
desegregation plan of unusual- flexibility that would address both edu-
cation and race. In the process of forging the final plan, the court 
considered five models submitted to it and from these formulated the 
Phase II plan. 
The following four sections focus upon the events leading to the 
formulation of the district court's Phase II plan. The first discusses 
the contempt order levied against three members of the Boston 
School Committee. The second examines the proposed plans submit-
ted to the district court. The third deals with the Phase II plan pro-
mulgated by the court. Finally, the fourth section discusses the orders 
involving teacher desegregation. 
§15.3. The Contempt Order. Due to disobedience of its orders, 
the federal court found three members of the School Committee in 
contempt of court and later considered whether the School Commit-
tee should be placed in receivership. 1 School authorities have an af-
firmative obligation to proffer acceptable remedies to bring about a 
unitary school system when there has been a finding of unconstitu-
tional segregation. 2 In such cases, it is common for courts to require 
local school authorities to submit proposed desegregation plans.3 The 
Boston school desegregation case was no exception. On October 31, 
1974, Judge Garrity entered an order establishing a filing date and 
§15.3. 1 Following extensive hearings in Boston commencing in june, 1975, the U.S. 
Civil Rights Commission found that the Boston School Committee's compliance with the 
court's desegregation order was so minimal as to amount to obstruction of the orders 
and therefore recommended that the Committee be placed into receivership. "Deseg-
regating the Boston Public Schools: A Crisis in Civic Responsibility," Report of the U.S. 
Civil Rights Commission, 52-64 (August 1975). The court ordered the parties to submit 
memoranda by September 26, 1975 on whether there had been such minimal com-
pliance by the Committee, and, if so, to make recommendations on what action the 
court should take. Morgan, Transcript 8/29/75 at 56-64. The Committee filed a reply 
memorandum and the matter is pending. There is precedent for such a receivership. 
In one school desegregation case, Turner v. Goolsby, 255 F. Supp. 724, 731 (S.D. Ga. 
1966), the local school committee was placed in receivership and the state superinten-
dent of schools was made the receiver. See generally Note, Receivership as a Remedy in Civil 
Rights Cases, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 115 ( 1969). 
2 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971); Green v. 
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968). 
3 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) (Brown II); United States v. 
Board of School Comm'rs, 503 F.2d 68, 72 (7th Cir. 1974). See also Adams v. Mathews, 
403 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1968); Vaughns v. Board of Educ., 355 F. Supp. 1034, 1037-38 
(D. Md. 1972). 
2
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setting forth standards for a school desegregation plan.4 The order 
required that the plan be filed by December 16, 197 4 . and stated: 
"[T]he plan shall be approved by vote of the defendant school com-
mittee before submission to the court."5 Other parties and community 
groups were given until Januray 20, 1975 to file criticisms of the 
School Committee's plan or to file alternative plans. 6 
The Committee, however, did not meet the deadline established by 
the court. It refused, by a three to two vote, to approve the plan pre-
pared by the staff of the Boston School Department (December 16 
plan). Nor did the School Committee approve any other plan for fil-
ing with the court. Counsel for the School Committee nevertheless 
filed the staff plan with the court and then sought leave to withdraw 
from the case. 7 Plaintiffs filed motions for criminal and civil contempt 
against the three members of the School Committee who had voted 
not to approve the plan for filing. 
In preparation for the hearing of these contempt motions, the court 
issued a procedural order requiring the three School Committee 
members to file in writing the answers to five questions concerning 
their willingness to comply with court orders and to take affirmative 
steps toward desegregation. 8 The virtually identical answers filed by 
4 Among the standards established were these: 
Taking into account the safety of students and the practicalities of the situation, 
the student desegregation plan shall provide for the greatest possible degree of ac-
tual desegregation of·all grades in all schools in all parts of the city. In drafting the 
plan, the defendants shall utilize as a starting point and keep in mind the goal that 
the racial composition of the student body of every school should generally reflect 
the ratios of white and black students enrolled at that grade level of schools, 
elementary, intermediate and secondary, throughout the system. 
Morgan, Order Establishing Filing Date and General Contents of Desegregation Plan at 
2-3 (Oct. 31, 1974). 
5 !d. at 5. 
6 /d. at 6. 
7 Morgan, Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel, filed Dec. 17, 1974. Leave to 
withdraw was granted a month later when new counsel for the Committee entered an 
appearance. 
6 The order was issued orally on December 18, 1974, and confirmed by written order 
on December 23, 1974. The questions were as follows: 
(1) What affirmative steps, if any, will you take to promote the peaceful implemen-
tation of the state court plan currently in effect? 
(2) Will you vote to take the steps necessary to implement a citywide desegregation 
plan, as outlined in the eleven timetables included in section VII of the plan sub-
mitted December 16, 1974, such as approval of contracts for transportation of stu-
dents and for changes in and repairs of facilities? 
(3) Will you obey and carry out future orders of the court concerning implementa-
tion of a citywide student and faculty desegregation plan, such orders as are now 
being formulated or may in the future be approved by the court? 
(4) To what extent, if at all, has your commitment made in the letter of November 
11, 1974 from Secretary Winter of the School Committee to the Department of 
Health, Education and Welfare that "the Boston public schools presently are, and 
3
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the three essentially stated that although they would obey all lawful 
orders of the court, they would take no affirmative steps beyond what 
the court had ordered.9 At the hearing on the contempt motion, new 
counsel for the School Committee conceded that there had been dis-
obedience, but argued that there was no contempt because the dis-
obedience was insubstantial and had resulted in no harm to the plain-
tiffs, and because a plan had, in fact, been filed. 10 The court held the 
three Committee members in civil contempt but denied the motion 
for criminal contempt.U 
Specifically, the court held that the three had violated its October 
31, 1974 order in two respects: (1) they had not approved a citywide 
desegregation plan on or before December 16, 1974, and (2) they had 
not submitted a plan to the court. 12 In censuring the School 
Committee's disobedience, the court relied on the recent opinion of 
the Supreme Judicial Court in Springfield School Committee v. Board of 
Education 13 that "[a] plan submitted without approval by a school 
committee is a clear indication that full effort and commitment has 
not been made toward developing a viable solution to the problem at 
hand."14 
Thus, the disobedience was not insubstantial. As the federal court 
noted, "[i]f such a course of conduct should become habitual or 
should be ignored by the Court as simply something that is not im-
portant, the Court believes that there never, ever would be a deseg-
regation plan for this city formulated and implemented." 15 
Furthermore, the court found two categories of damage to the 
plaintiffs. First, the plaintiffs had a constitutional right to have in-
will continue to be, in full compliance with these orders of the Federal Court for 
the desegregation of the Boston public schools. The Boston public schools will 
comply with all future modifications of the order," been changed or abandoned? 
(5) In view of the decision and opinion of the Court of Appeals dated December 
19, have you changed your position regarding approval of the December 16th de-
segregation plan and, if so, in what way? 
Morgan, Orders in Preparation for Civil Contempt Hearing at l-2, Dec. 23, 1974. 
9 Morgan, Transcript 12/27/74 at 42-47. 
10 See McNeil v. United States, 236 F.2d 149 (lst Cir. 1956). 
11 Morf(an, Transcript 12/27/74 at 90. 
12 !d. at 95. One court, defining the elements of civil contempt, has stated that it "may 
be predicated upon a finding of 'clear and convincing' evidence that there was a lawful 
order and violation of that order." United States v. Greyhound Corp., 363 F. Supp. 
525, 570 (D. Ill. 1973). 
13 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 657,311 N.E.2d 69. 
14 !d. at 665, 311 N.E.2d at 75. The federal court also reiterated another point con-
tained in the School Committee opinion: if the school committee did not adopt a plan 
submitted to the court as its own, it would be free to appeal the court's actions, regard-
less of what plan the court adopted. See id. at 665-66, 311 N.E.2d at 75. Morgan, 
Transcript 12/27174 at 25-26. 
15 Morgan, Transcript 12/27174 at 96. 
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valved in drafting the plan the resources that are available only from 
local school officials. 16 Secondly, approximately $1.9 million available 
to Boston under the federal Emergency School Assistance Actl 7 would 
be withheld until the Committee was in compliance with court 
orders.18 
The court found that the harm to the plaintiffs could be remedied, 
and the contempt purged, if each contemnor voted "at a meeting of 
the Boston school committee to 'authorize' the prompt submission to 
the court of a citywide student desegregation plan. As a matter of law, 
such a plan will have been submitted by the defendant school 
committee."19 No longer did the court require "approval" of a plan; 
"authorization" would suffice. Unless the contempt was so cured by 
January 7, 1975, sanctions would be imposed.20 The contemnors' mo-
tion for a stay of this order was denied by the district court,21 which 
denial was affirmed on appeal. 22 
At a meeting of the Boston School Committee on January 7, 1975, 
the contemnors voted to direct the staff to amend the December 16, 
1974 plan so that it did not employ "forced busing" and to submit 
that amended plan to the court. The court found that this vote 
purged the contempt so long as the amended plan was filed by 
January 20, 1975.23 The Committee did file a plan, thereby curing the 
contempt. 
§15.4. Developing the Phase II Desegregation Plan. By early 
February, 1975, four desegregation plans had been filed with the 
court: the December 16 plan, the School Committee plan, the plain-
tiffs' plan, and the Home & School Association plan. In addition, ex-
tensive commentary had been filed on all of the plans by all parties 
and by some community groups. Although none of these plans was 
adopted by the court, they greatly influenced the shape of the final 
plan. 
16 /d. at 96-97. As noted in Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299 (l955) 
(Brown II): "School authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, 
and solving [desegregation] problems." 
17 20 u.s.c. §§ 236, 240 (1970). 
18 Morgan, Transcript 12/27174 at 97. 
19 Morgan, Memorandum and Order as to Sanctions for Civil Contempt (December 
30, 1974) at 4. 
20 /d. The proposed sanctions included payment of a daily fine by the contemnors, 
their exclusion from any School Committee action pertaining to the desegregation of 
Boston's public schools, and regarding the two contemnors who were members of the 
bar, possible suspension from federal practice for the duration of the contempt. Id. at 
4-5. See Local Rule 5(d), Rules of the United States District Court for Massachusetts. 
21 Morgan, Order on Motion for Stay of Order Pending Appeal (January 3, 1975). 
22 Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 618 (lst Cir. 1975). 
23 Morgan, Memorandum and Conditional Order as to Three Defendants' Civil Con-
tempt (Jan. 8, 1975). 
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Three of these plans1 were referred by the court to a panel of mas-
ters composed of two attorneys and two educators, to conduct hear-
ings and make recommendations to the court. 2 For the reasons ex-
plained below, the masters rejected all of these plans and developed 
their own plan. After the masters submitted their recommended plan, 
it appeared that the plan was based on erroneous factual data that 
seriously affected the degree of desegregation it achieved.3 Although 
the court adopted most of the suggestions contained in the masters' 
plan, it modified the masters' plan in several respects, finding that the 
district lines recommended in the masters' plan could "result in the 
sort of residential instability that could destroy in a few years the de-
segregation accomplished initially."4 The plans before the court and 
the action taken on them were as follows. 
December 16 Plan. The December 16 plan was the original plan de-
veloped by the School Department staff, rejected by the majority of 
the School Committee, yet filed by counsel. The plan divided the city 
into six zones. 5 Parents would be given the choice of different kinds 
of schools within each zone: (1) at the elementary level, traditional, 
open space, or ungraded; (2) at the intermediate level, flexible cluster 
or traditional, with limited enrollment magnet programs to be de-
veloped at each school; and (3) at the high school level, district high 
schools with individual magnet programs and citywide thematic high 
schools. 6 Such parental choice would be exercised through a program 
option system of selecting a school within the zone in which the pupil 
lived or of selecting a citywide school. 7 The plan did not define any 
particular ranges of acceptable racial compositions for district schools 
within which parental choices would be honored or denied and which 
would ensure integration of the schools. The plan also suggested that 
Charlestown and East Boston be excluded from any requirement of 
desegregation. 8 
The court, after consideration of the December 16 plan, found that 
§15.4. 1 The court ruled the Home & School Association plan unacceptable as a 
matter of law. Morgan, Transcript 2/5/75 at 65. See text at notes '28-36 infra. 
2 Morgan v. Kerrigan, Memorandum of Decision and Remedial Orders, 401 F. Supp. 
216, 227 (D. Mass. 1975), affd, Nos. 1184, 1194, 1197, 1212 (1st Cir., Jan. 14, 1976). 
See FED. R. C1v. P. 53(c). 
3 For instance, the Masters' plan projected the racial composition of the West Rox-
bury District to be 80 percent white. In fact, the District as drawn was 92 percent white. 
401 F. Supp. at 236. 
4 ld. at 237. 
5 Dec. 16 plan at V-1 to V-126. 
6 ld. at IV-I to IV-67. Although some of these different educational approaches ex-
isted in Boston, the majority would have to be developed. 
7 !d. at VI-I to VI-20. 
8 ld. at V-59. 
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the plan prepared by the masters, as modified by the court, was 
"preferable for reasons of feasibility."9 
School Committee Plan. The School Committee plan relied entirely on 
voluntary parental choice to accomplish desegregation. The complex 
assignment process in this plan involved five different sequential 
steps. First, parents who chose for their children to remain in their 
current "racially mixed" schools would be allowed to do so. 10 Second, 
parents could choose to send their children to a citywide magnet or 
alternative school that was "guaranteed" to be integrated, 11 although 
the plan did not specify how. Third, parents and students could sub-
scribe to magnet schools within their zones. 12 Fourth, parents could 
enroll their children in "cross racial" schools in a zone. 13 Fifth, any 
remaining parents and students would be given the choice of attend-
ing any school in the zone within which they lived. 14 If such zonal 
schools were "racially isolated,"15 students from those schools would 
participate on a part time basis in third-site integrated programs.16 
The degree of integration was, therefore, entirely to be determined 
by the pattern of choices made by parents, except for the periods of 
attendance at third-site resource centers. 
The masters and the court found that the School Committee plan 
was basically a "freedom of choice" plan. 17 Such plans are constitu-
tionally unacceptable where there are more effective methods of de-
segregation reasonably available. 18 Experience both elsewhere19 and 
with voluntary programs in Boston20 has demonstrated that the 
School Committee plan would be ineffective in achieving desegrega-
tion in schools. The federal district court found that the addition of 
9 401 F. Supp. at 229. 
10 "Racially mixed" schools were defined as schools whose racial compositions were 
plus or minus 15 percent of the citywide school racial composition. School Committee 
plan VI-5 to VI-8, VI-24 (filed Jan. 27, 1975). 
11 !d. at Vl-9. 
12 !d. at VI-I 0. 
13 "Cross racial" schools were defined as schools located in neighborhoods that are 
predominantly white or predominantly minority. !d. at VI-11 to VI-21. 
14 !d. at VI-22. 
15 "Racially isolated" schools were defined as schools whose race composition varied 
more than 15 percent from the racial composition of the entire zone at that level of 
schools (i.e. elementary, intermediate, high schools). !d. 
16 Elementary students would spend one day a week at such a center; middle school 
students would spend one day every two weeks; the time for high school students was 
not defined. !d. at IV-72. 
17 401 F. Supp. at 228. 
18 !d. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 441 (1968). 
19 See, e.g., Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 417 F.2d 801 (5th Cir. 1969). 
20 Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. at 456. 
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third-site resource centers did not save the plan.21 Judge Garrity re-
jected the School Committee plan, since it did not promise realistically 
to desegregate the public schools. 22 
The Plaintiffs' Plan. The plan submitted by the plaintiffs was a stu-
dent assignment plan that contemplated the assignment of students to 
particular schools by attributing specific geocodes23 to certain schools, 
school pairs, or clusters within the six zones set forth in the December 
16 plan. 24 The plan used the existing citywide schools as citywide 
schools and did not propose any new ones.25 It did not propose de-
velopment of additional magnet programs, but noted that the Com-
mittee remained free to do so.26 Although such a plan would de-
segregate the schools, it was rejected by the court, which found its 
own plan to be more feasible. 27 
The Home & School Association Plan. The Home & School Association 
plan28 continued the racial balance plan then in effect and added to it 
only certain of the other schools in the city. 29 There was some dispute 
whether these additonal schools would, in fact, have been desegre-
gated under the Association's plan.30 
The Home & School Association plan did not purport to be a 
citywide desegregation plan. The Association argued that despite the 
court's earlier ruling that the unconstitutional segregation was sys-
temwide, the remedy must be limited to those areas of the city where 
specific examples of purposeful segregation by the School Committee 
had been proven.31 In support of this theory, the Association relied 
on language in Milliken v. Bradley 32 that the extent of the remedy must 
21 401 F. Supp. at 228. Such programs, whereby pupils of different races meet several 
times a week to participate in special educational programs have been seen as devices to 
avoid adoption of an effective desegregation plan. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 380 F. 
Supp. 673, 682 (D. Colo. 1974). See also United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 
848, 872 (5th Cir. 1972). 
22 401 F. Supp. at 228-29. 
23 "Geocodes" are the 800 plus areas, each several blocks in size, into which the school 
department has divided the city for planning purposes. !d. at 240 n.12. 
24 Plaintiffs' plan at 1. 
25 !d. 
26 !d. at 2. 
27 401 F. Supp. at 229. 
28 The Home & School Association is an organization of parents of children in the 
Boston Public Schools, teachers, and other interested persons. It was allowed to inter-
vene in the remedial proceedings only as to issues related to the desegregation of stu-
dents and the formulation of a student desegregation plan. Morgan, Order Allowing In-
tervention, Dec. 27, 1974. 
29 Home & School Ass'n plan at 6. 
30 See Morgan, State Defendants' Commentary on Home & School Ass'n Plan (filed 
Feb. 3, 1975). 
31 Morgan, Brief of Boston Home & School Ass'n with Respect to the Proper Scope of 
the Court's Remedial Decree (filed Feb. 20, 1975). 
32 418 u.s. 717, 744-45 (1974). 
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be limited to the extent of the liability. 33 The/Association sought to in-
troduce evidence on patterns of racial and ethnic separatism in Bos-
ton to support its premise that segregation in the public schools re-
sulted from many nongovernmental factors, including residential 
segregation. 34 
The federal district court rejected the Home & School Association 
plan and its legal theory, stating that the very issue the Association 
sought to litigate in the remedial proceedings-the extent of the seg-
regation and its cause-had been litigated and determined in the lia-
bility proceedings. 35 The segregation was systemwide, and the obliga-
tion of the School Committee was to remedy the segregation on a sys-
temwide basis.36 Consequently, the plan was rejected as a matter of 
law.37 
§15.5. The Court's Phase II Plan. The desegregation plan 
promulgated by the court on May 10, 1975 (the "Phase II plan") 
combined parental choice with mandatory assignments, 1 attempted to 
preserve a sense of community by creating community districts each 
with a citizen advisory council,2 and brought the resources of the 
area's colleges and universities to bear on remedying the educational 
deprivations attendant to segregation.3 The court's exercise of its 
equitable powers in fashioning the Phase II plan was promptly chal-
lenged by the School Committee as a usurpation of its authority. 4 
The plan divided the city into eight geographic districts, called 
community school districts. 5 With the exception of the East Boston 
district,6 each of the districts extended from the largely black center 
of the city to the largely white periphery of the city. The projected ra-
33 Morgan, Transcript 2/5175 at 24-25. 
34 I d. at 17-18. 
35 ld. at 66. 
36 ld. at 73. 
37 ld. at 65-74. See 401 F. Supp. at 227. 
§15.5. 1 Memorandum of Decision and Remedial Orders, Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 
F. Supp. 216, 249 (D. Mass. 1 ~75), affd, Nos. 75-1184, 1194, 1197, 1212 (1st Cir., Jan. 
14, 1976). 
2 ld. at 248. 
3 ld. at 247. 
4 Morgan v. Kerrigan, No. 75-1184, 1194, 1197, 1212 (lst Cir., Jan. 14, 1976) 
[hereinafter cited as Morgan Slip Opinion]. 
5 The districts are primarily named for the areas of the city they encompass: 
(1) Brighton-Mission Hill (5) Dorchester 
(2) Jamaica Plain (6) South Boston 
(3) West Roxbury (7) Madison Park 
(4) Hyde Park (8) East Boston 
401 F. Supp. at 253. 
6 The East Boston district was left as a geographically separate white district. 
Nevertheless, the conversion of several East Boston schools to citywide magnet schools 
will result in some integration in East Boston. ld. at 238. 
9
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cial compositions of these seven districts ranged from 61 percent to 40 
percent white, from 48 percent to 33 percent black, and from 25 per-
cent to 4 percent other minorities. 7 
In addition to the community districts, there was established a 
citywide magnet school district. 8 Included in the citywide district were 
those schools with special entrance requirements such as Boston Latin 
School, Boston Latin Academy, and Boston Technical High School. 
Both the citywide and community district schools were required to 
provide bilingual education and to accommodate students with special 
needs. 9 
The Boston School Department was required to assign students to 
schools in accordance with the framework established by the court 
and under its supervision. 10 The assignment process was initiated by 
sending an application form to all parents, who provided data about 
the students and chose between assignment to the community school 
district in which they lived and assignment to a specific citywide 
school. 11 These choices were to be honored by the School Department 
as much as possible within the racial percentage guidelines established 
for the schools. 12 The permissible racial composition range for schools 
in community districts was a 25 percent variation from the racial 
composition of the district. 13 For the citywide schools, the permissible 
range was a 5 percent variation from the systemwide percentages of 
51 percent white, and 49 percent black and other minority. 14 
In additon, a timetable was set for the School Department to com-
plete the student assignments, to assign faculty, to make facility 
changes, to formulate a transportation plan, and to develop a safety 
plan. 15 
7 The projected racial compositions for the districts were as follows: 
District White % Black % Other Minority % 
1 44 33 23 
2 45 40 15 
3 56 39 5 
4 61 35 4 
5 45 48 7 
6 53 33 14 
7 40 35 25 
8 95 3 2 
8 Morgan, Memorandum of Decision and Remedial Orders, Pt. II, 12-41 Qune 5, 
1975). 401 F. Supp. at 256. Magnet schools have been used as a desegregation device in 
other cities. See, e.g., Hart v. Community School Bd., 512 F.2d 37, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1975). 
9 401 F. Supp. at 252. 
10 !d. at 257-58. 
II /d. 
12 !d. at 261. 
13 /d. E.g., District 1 is 44 percent white. When 44 percent is multiplied by 25 percent, 
the range of alteration is 11 percent. Thus District 1 may range between 33 percent 
and 55 percent white. 
14 !d. at 262. 
15 !d. at 269-70. 
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According to the court's estimates, the transportation required in 
implementing the Phase II plan would not be overly burdensome. 
The court estimated that its plan would involve the mandatory trans-
portation of approximately 21,000 students; 16 in the years prior to de-
segregation, approximately 30,000 students required daily trans-
portation.17 Within the community school districts, the plan stated 
that the average trip would be less than 2.5 miles, and the longest trip 
5 miles. 18 The average travel time was set at between 10 and 15 min-
utes, and the longest travel time at approximately 25 minutes. 19 
In formulating the Phase II plan, the federal district court was 
guided by Supreme Court decisions establishing remedial require-
ments for segregated school systems. As the Supreme Court held in 
Green v. County School Board, 20 any desegregation plan must promise 
"realistically to work, and to work now"21 and must eliminate racial 
discrimination "root and branch."22 Toward this end, courts may alter 
student assignment plans and attendance zones and may order stu-
dent transportation.23 Although racial ratios may be used as a starting 
point in fashioning a remedy, the Constitution does not require the 
attainment of a particular fixed mathematical norm. 24 A presumption 
exists, however, against schools in the same school system whose ra-
cial compositions are substantially disproportionate.25 The con-
tinuance of such schools may be justified only if, in view of the "prac-
ticalities of the situation," the greatest effort towards actual desegrega-
tion has been made. 26 The fear of "white flight" is not acceptable as a 
reason for achieving "anything less than complete uprooting of the 
dual public school system."27 The court's plan was challenged on ap-
peal as misapplying these standards.28 
One of the more controversial aspects of the assignment plan was 
the requirement that the entering seventh and additonal ninth grade 
classes at the three examination schools, Boston Latin School, Boston 
Latin Academy, and Boston Technical High School, be 35 percent 
black and hispanic. 29 The School Department was to select minority 
16 ld. at 263. 
17 ld. at 239. 
18 I d. at 263. 
l9Jd. 
20 391 u.s. 430 (1968). 
21 ld. at 439. 
22 ld. at 438. 
23 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). 
24 ld. at 24-25. 
25 ld. at 26. 
26 Davis v. Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971). 
27 United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 490-91 (1972). See 
also Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972). 
28 See Morgan Slip Opinion. 
29 401 F. Supp. at 258. 
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students on the basis of SSAT scores,30 grade-point averages, or class 
standings, or combinations of these. 31 This procedure was challenged 
by some parties as impermissibly establishing racial quotas, in contra-
vention of the prohibition in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of 
Education 32 on the use of "fixed mathematical norms."33 The federal 
court's order, however, provided only a partial, interim remedy to the 
segregation that exists at the examination schools in that it would ini-
tially desegregate only the seventh grade of schools having grades 
seven through twelve. 34 In other school desegregation cases, courts 
have prohibited student assignment plans based on achievement tests, 
finding that such programs frustrate the establishment of a unitary 
school system. 35 
The court's plan also involved parents in the desegregation process, 
by creating several citizen advisory councils to assist with the im-
plementation and monitoring of the plan. During the first phase of 
desegregation, Racial-Ethnic Parents' Councils and Students' Councils 
were established at each school affected by the state plan. 36 The Par-
ents' Councils elected a Citywide Parents Advisory Council (CPAC). 37 
The second stage of desegregation brought with it further citizen par-
ticipation, in the form of the Citywide Coordinating Council (CCC) 
and the Community District Advisory Councils (CDAC).38 
The CCC is the primary body monitoring implementation on behalf 
of the court. 39 The CCC, composed of approximately forty members, 
is divided into an executive committee and six subject-matter 
committees.40 The functions assigned to the CCC were to provide ac-
curate information on the desegregation process to the public, to 
monitor all phases of implementation including safety procedures and 
training programs, to act as a community and district council liaison, 
and to meet with the School Committee and Superintendent at least 
30 Secondary School Aptitude Test, a product of the Educational Testing Service of 
Princeton, New Jersey. The SSA T is the method that has been used since the 1972-7 3 
school year to select entrants to the examination schools. Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. 
Supp. 410, 467-68 (D. Mass. 1974), affd sub nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st 
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). 
31 401 F. Supp. at 258. 
32 402 u.s. 1 (1971). 
33 Morgan Slip Opinion at 36-39. 
34 401 F. Supp. at 258. 
35 Lemon v. Bossier Parish School Bd., 444 F.2d 1400, 1401 (5t)l Cir. 1971); United 
States.v. Sunflower County School Dist., 430 F.2d 839, 841 (5th Cir. 1970). 
36 401 F. Supp. at 248. 
37 !d. at 267. 
38 !d. at 265. 
39 !d. at 266-67. 
40 !d. at 265. The six committees are Public Information, Monitoring, Community 
Liaison, District Council Liaison, Education Programs, Public Safety and Transporta-
tion. 
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once a monthY It was specifically ordered not to comanage or make 
policy for the Boston Schools. 42 In addition, the CCC is empowered to 
conduct hearings, to hold public meetings, to make written reports, to 
inspect school facilities, and to bring unresolved problems to the at-
tention of the court. 43 
The plan also established nine Community District Advisory Coun-
cils, one for each district, to act as advisory groups to school depart-
ment personnel and to monitor implementation of the plan on the 
district level. 44 Each council is composed of parents, students, school 
staff, and others concerned with the educational process in the 
district.45 Such multiracial councils have been used in other desegre-
gation cases to assist in the monitoring and implementation of the 
program. 46 A body similar to the CCC was established in Keyes v. 
School District No. 1, 47 the Denver desegregation case. 
The court's plan also drew upon~ the resources of local universities 
and businesses.48 At the court's request, a number of Boston-area uni-
versities and businesses volunteered to be "paired" with Boston 
schools to help develop magnet49 and other specialized programs in 
both the citywide and the district schools. 50 The Boston School Com-
mittee was ordered to use its best efforts to enter into contracts with 
the universities. 51 
Several rationales support this involvement of outside educational 
institutions with the Boston public schools. The heart of the Phase II 
plan is the magnet school system, whose success depends upon its abil-
ity to attract students.52 It was expected that the university pairings 
would add substantially to the magnetism of these schools by improv-
ing the quality of education and developing innovative programs. 53 In 
41 /d. at 265-66. 
42 !d. at 265. 
43 /d. at 266-67. 
44 !d. at 267. 
45 /d. 
46 See, e.g., Carr v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 377 F. Supp. 1123, 1140 (M.D. 
Ala. 1974), affd, 511 F.2d 1374.(5th Cir. 1975); Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 
313 F. Supp. 1193, 1206 (W.D. La.), modified on other grounds, 434 F.2d 144 (5th Cir. 
1970). 
47 380 F. Supp. 673 (D. Colo. 1974). 
48 401 F. Supp. at 249. 
49 Both the December 16 and the Committee plans relied heavily on the use of mag-
net programs, a device the court incorporated into its own plan. See Dec. 16 plan at 
IV-39; School Committee plan at IV-33. 
50 401 F. Supp. at 259. 
51 /d. at 247. The initial funding for the development of these programs was pro-
vided by the State Board of Education pursuant to Act of 1974, c. 636, §§ 1, 8. 
52 401 F. Supp. at 235. 
53 /d. The establishment of magnet schools has been recognized as a viable tool for 
remedying a segregated school system. See Hart v. Community School Bd., 512 F.2d 37, 
54-55 (2d Cir. 1975). 
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addition, the involvement of the universities should assist achieving 
the goal of equalization of the facilities and services available to all 
students. 54 The universities will also assist in fashioning remedial 
programs to counteract the adverse educational effects of seg-
regation.55 
Three parties56 appealed from the court's Phase II plan, arguing 
that the plan exceeded the district court's remedial discretion. In 
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 57 the First Circuit upheld the plan formulated by 
Judge Garrity. The arguments advanced by the appellants embraced 
two theories: (1) that the district court was not empowered, by virtue 
of the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 197 4, 58 to fashion its 
own plan, since the masters' plan was constitutionally sufficient; 59 and 
(2) that the court's plan created quotas in contravention of the re-
quirements of Swann. 60 
The Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 (the "Act") man-
dates that courts impose "only such remedies as are essential to cor-
rect particular denials of equal educational opportunity or equal pro-
tection of the laws."61 The Act sets forth an order of priority to be fol-
lowed in implementing specific remedies and directs the court to 
make findings as to the efficacy of the measures considered in struc-
turing a desegregation plan.62 In addition, the Act specifically pro-
vides that it "is not intended to modify or diminish the authority of 
the courts of the United States to enforce fully the fifth and four-
teenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States."63 
In considering the application of the Act to the Boston school case, 
the First Circuit first examined the effect of the Act on the district 
court's duties and powers. After noting that the Act places much re-
liance on findings and assessments made by the judge and that the 
statute disavows any intent to encroach upon the judicial obligation to 
enforce the Constitution, the appellate court concluded: 
By explicitly leaving the district court the power to determine the 
adequacy of remedies, the Act necessarily does not restrict the 
54 401 F. Supp. at 234. See United States v. Wilcox County Bd. of Educ., 454 F.2d 
1144 (5th Cir. 1972); Henry v. Clarksdale Municipal Separate School Dist., 409 F.2d 
682, 685 n.5 (5th Cir. 1969). 
55 401 F. Supp. at 235. See United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 
385, 394 (5th Cir. 1967). 
56 The defendant School Committee, the defendant Mayor, and the intervenor Home 
& School Ass'n. 
57 Nos. 75-1184, 1194, 1197, 1212 (1st Cir.,Jan. 14, 1976). 
58 20 U .S.C. § 170 I et seq. (Supp. IV 1974). 
59 Morgan Slip Opinion at 13. 
60 /d. at 34. 
61 20 U.S.C. § 1712 (Supp. IV 1974). 
62 /d. §§ 1713, 1714. 
63 /d. § 1702(b). 
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breadth of discretion of that court to determine what scope of 
remedy is constitutionally required. Thus the Act manifests a 
purpose not to limit judicial power but to guide and channel its 
exercise.64 
The Act, then, does not restrict the power of the court to fashion ap-
propriate remedies, but guides the court by instructing that less dras-
tic measures be considered and, if possible, implemented prior to re-
sorting to compulsory busing. 65 
The First Circuit then considered whether Judge Garrity had paid 
heed to the considerations required by the Act. The appellate court 
found that the district court had followed the mandates of the statute: 
referring to the Act, Judge Garrity had made specific findings that 
the transportation and other methods utilized in his plan were necessary 
to remedy effectively the violation of constitutional rights.66 Since the 
district court had thus purported to be guided by the Act, the First Circuit 
considered whether the court's findings and conclusions were sufficiently 
supported. In holding that they were, the appellate court noted that the 
court's plan effected a greater degree of desegregation than did the 
masters' plan.67 The First Circuit's conclusion reflects the difficulties 
inherent in establishing the specific point at which a remedy satisfies the 
constitutional minimum: 
When we ask ourselves whether a slight increase of maximum 
percentage of planned white enrollment at some schools, or leav-
ing some elementary schools unaffected, or adding a few more 
magnet schools would achieve the constitutional minimum with 
less compulsory busing, we realize that the concept of this 
minimum cannot be identified with precision. Whatever prescrip-
tion may be adopted by a judge, after months and years of con-
sideration, it _is doubtless always possible to make a case that some-
thing less will do. We have no basis for holding that the court ex-
ceeded its obligation to do all that it feasibly could to extirpate the 
effects of the constitutional violations over the years. 68 
The district court, then, had properly exercised its equitable powers 
in promulgating the Phase II plan and had not violated the Equal 
Educational Opportunities Act of 1974. 
Appellants also argued that the district court had impermissibly re-
lied upon racial quotas and percentages, particularly those set for the 
citywide schools. In rejecting this contention, the First Circuit found 
that the district court had employed the percentages properly, as a 
64 Morgan Slip Opinion at 16. 
65 !d. 
66 /d. at 16-17. See 401 F. Supp. at 263-64. 
67 Morgan Slip Opinion at 18-20. 
68 /d. at 20. 
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starting point in establishing a school desegregation plan for Boston. 69 
The appellate court also approved the plan's provision that the 
enrollment at each citywide magnet school fall within 5 percent of the 
citywide racial composition. The establishment of such a narrow range 
was permissible, in view of the special role of the magnet schools in 
the desegregation plan. Since attendance at the specialized schools was 
voluntary, their efficacy as a desegregation tool would be minimal if 
the schools became racially identifiable. 70 
The district court's plan was also challenged by the Home & School 
Association as being too broad in scope, the Association arguing that 
the court had not confined the remedy to segregation resulting solely 
from illegal official action. 71 The First Circuit upheld the district 
court's rejection of the Association's remedial theory, finding that it 
would fail to vindicate the students' constitutional rights72 and that in-
troduction of evidence relating to the cause of the segregation in Bos-
ton would be improper at this stage of the proceeding. 73 
§15.6. Teacher Desegregation. In furtherance of its goal of dis-
mantling the dual school system in Boston, the federal district court 
issued faculty desegregation orders as well as the student desegrega-
tion plan. In Morgan v. Hennigan, 1 the opinion on liability, the court 
held that the hiring and assignment of faculty and staff for the Bos-
ton school system had been done on an unconstitutional basis.2 Specif-
ically, the court held that (1) the School Committee had "knowingly 
pursued policies resulting in racial segregation of teachers and ad-
ministrative personnel, thereby reinforcing the racial identifiability of 
schools and increasing the racial segregation of students;"3 (2) the 
Committee had "knowingly pursued policies resulting in less qualified, 
less experienced, and lower paid teachers in predominantly black 
schools;"4 and (3) the Committee had "violated the constitutional right 
of public school students to have the school system operated free of 
racial discrimination in the recruiting, employment, and promotion of 
teachers and staff."5 
Having thus determined that segregation existed among the faculty 
and staff, as well as among the students, the federal court held hear-
69 !d. at 34-35. 
70 !d. at 36. 
71 !d. at 20. 
72 !d. at 26. 
73 !d. at 28. 
§15.6. 1 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass.), affd sub nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 
580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). 
2 379 F. Supp. at 456. 
3 !d. 
4 !d. 
5 !d. 
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ings to determine what remedial action was appropriate. 6 At this 
stage, the Boston Teachers Union, the collective bargaining 
representative for most Boston school teachers, was allowed to inter-
vene solely to participate in the formulation of remedial orders con-
cerning teacher hiring, transfer, and promotion procedures. 7 
In Boston, three categories of teachers were employed: permanent, 
provisional, and temporary substitutes. 8 Provisional teachers, who 
were uncertified and employed on the basis of yearly contracts, had 
somewhat fewer rights and benefits than permanent teachers. 9 Tem-
porary substitutes were hired on a daily basis to fill in at a rate of 
compensation lower than that for provisionals. 10 
The court's orders involved increasing the number of black teachers 
at both the permanent and provisional levels. On July 31, 1974, the 
court issued interim orders concerning teacher hiring and desegrega-
tion prior to the opening of schools in September, 1974.U The court 
ordered that 280 new permanent teachers be hired, on the basis of 
one black permanent teacher to each white permanent teacher hired 
until all qualified blacks had been hired. 12 Within this group, priority 
was to be given to those who were on eligible lists for the position and 
who had been provisional teachers with satisfactory ratings. After the 
permanent teachers had been hired, qualified provisionals13 were to 
be hired on a one-to-one basis. The Committee was also directed to 
recruit additional black candidates. Finally, the School Committee was 
required to transfer white and black teachers, to reduce the concen-
tration of black teachers in black schools, and to increase the number 
of experienced teachers in those schools. 14 
On the intervenor Union's appeals from these orders, the First Cir-
cuit upheld the lower court's orders as a permissible remedy to rectify 
the pervasive violations of the constitutional rights of black school 
children. 15 The court of appeals rejected the Union's arguments that 
the relief must be limited to that necessary to vindicate the rights of 
black teachers and applicants who had been discriminated against. 16 
6 Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d.599, 600 (1st Cir. 1974). 
1Jd. 
8 379 F. Supp. at 457. 
9 /d. 
10 !d. 
11 On July 31, 1974, the court issued its orders orally; on August 9, 1974, a written 
order was filed. 
12 "Qualified" was defined as a person having a Massachusetts teaching certificate 
pursuant to G.L. c. 71, § 38G, or who had been a provisional teacher with a satisfactory 
rating. See 509 F.2d at 600. 
13 The qualification for provisional teachers was a college degree. See 379 F. Supp. at 
457. 
14 See 509 F.2d ~~ 600. Oral order,july 31, 1974. 
15 509 F.2d at 600-01. 
16 /d. at 600 n.3. 
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On January 28, 1975, the district court entered further orders on 
faculty recruitment and hiring, which supplanted the earlier interim 
orders. 17 In its orders, the court established a 20 percent hiring goal 
for black teachers, continued the system of employing one black 
teacher for each white teacher hired, required an affirmative recruit-
ment program until there is a 25 percent black faculty, and ordered 
the filing of periodic progress reports. 18 
The 20 percent hiring goal established by the court represented the 
percentage of blacks in Boston's population. In setting the figure, the 
court adopted neither the plaintiffs' position nor the position of the 
School Committee and Union. The plaintiffs had argued that, under 
the precedent of United States v. Texas Education Agency, 19 the hiring 
goal for black teachers should equal the black student population, or 
35 percent. 20 The Committee and Union had contended that, since 
the minimum qualification for teachers was a college degree, the black 
teacher hiring goal should equal the percentage of black college 
graduates in Boston or in the Northeast, respectively 5.25 percent and 
4.24 percent. 21 In using the percentage of blacks in the city's popula-
tion as the basis for the hiring goal, the court followed a pattern often 
used in employment discrimination cases. 22 On appeal, the First Cir-
cuit held that the district court had not abused its discretion in basing 
the hiring goal on the population percentage of blacks. 23 
B. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS 
§15.7. Racial Balance. The Legislature amended the Common-
wealth's racial balance law, sections 37C-37J of chapter 71 of the Gen-
eral Laws, during the summer of 1974, just prior to the implementa-
tion of state court-ordered racial balance plans in Boston 1 and 
Springfield.2 The amendments, chapter 636 of the Acts of 1974, sig-
nificantly weakened the racial balance law as a tool to achieve racial 
17 Morgan, Memorandum and Orders on Faculty Recruitment and Hiring Oan. 28, 
1975). 
18 /d. 
19 467 F.2d 848, 873 (5th Cir. 1972) (en bane). 
20 Morgan, Memorandum and Orders on Faculty Recruitment and Hiring Oan. 28, 
1975) at 3. 
21 /d. 
22 Boston Chapter, NAACP, Inc. v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1026 (lst Cir. 1974); 
NAACP v. Allen, 493 F.2d 614, 617 n.3 (5th Cir. 1974); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 
315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). 
23 Morgan v. Kerrigan, No. 75-1097 (1st Cir.,Jan. 26, 1976), slip opinion at 6. 
§15.7. 1 School Comm. v. Board of Educ., 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1315, 302 N.E.2d 
916 (Boston Ill). 
2 School Comm. v. Board of Educ., 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 657, 311 N.E.2d 69 (Spring-
field II). 
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balance in public schools. 3 A school committee is no longer required 
to formulate a racial balance plan upon certification by the Board of 
Education that racial imbalance exists in the schools within that 
committee's jurisdiction.4 The amendments provide that a school 
committee of a system with racially imbalanced schools must prepare a 
balance plan only if it cannot satisfy a request to transfer a nonwhite 
child from an imbalanced school to a "racially isolated" school or vice 
versa for a white child. 5 Although the amendments did not restrict 
the methods a school committee might use in its balance plan, the 
statute now circumscribes the authority of the state Board of Educa-
tion by providing that the only measures the Board of Education may 
require a local school committee to include in its plan are "additions 
to existing school buildings, use of leased or portable facilities, and 
changes in use of school buildings."6 
Relying on these amendments, the Springfield School Committee 
brought a motion to vacate the order in Springfield IJ7 that required 
implementation of a particular racial balance plan in Springfield. In 
School Committee v. Board of Education ("Springfield Ill"), 8 the Supreme 
Judicial Court rejected the attempted rescision of the balance plan 
and held that any action by the Legislature or the school committee 
that would rescind racial balance attained in Springfield would violate 
the United States and Massachusetts Constitutions. 9 The Court de-
clared chapter 636 unconstitutional to the extent that its application 
would rescind the implementation of the Springfield racial balance 
plan. 10 The attempt of the school committee to revoke the plan, in re-
liance upon chapter 636, was found unconstitutional. 11 
The Springfield II decision required the school committee to remedy 
the racial imbalance existing in five elementary schools by implement-
ing the "Task Force" plan. This plan divided the city into six districts, 
altering attendance zones and requiring some transportation of 
students. 12 The methods used in that plan to achieve balance were not 
methods contained in the amendments to the racial balance law. Prior 
to the suit, it appeared that the school committee was complying with 
3 Acts of 1974, c. 636. For a discussion of litigation under the racial balance law in 
prior years see Sticklor, Education Law, 1974 ANN. SuRv. MASS. LAw§ 20.2-.3, at 538-44. 
4 Acts of 1965, c. 641. 
5 A "racially isolated" school is defined as a school in which not more than 30 percent 
of the students are nonwhite. G.L. c. 71, § 37D. 
6 G.L. c. 15, § 11. 
7 Springfield II, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 657, 311 N.E.2d 69. 
8 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2031, 319 N.E.2d 427, cert. denied, 421 U.S. 947 (1975) 
(Springfield Ill). 
9 /d. at 2046-47, 319 N.E.2d at 434. 
10 /d. at 2047, 319 N.E.2d at 434. 
11 /d. 
12 Springfield II, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 659, 311 N.E.2d at 72. 
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the order and proceeding in accordance with the Task Force plan. 13 
Shortly after the Legislature amended the racial imbalance law, the 
Springfield School Committee directed its staff to cease implementa-
tion of the Task Force plan14 and filed a motion with the Single 
Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court to vacate the final decree after 
rescript that had been entered in Springfield II. 15 The school commit-
tee contended that the amending of the racial balance law had vitiated 
the legal grounds of the Springfield II order. 16 An intervenor group of 
school children and their parents opposed the motion to vacate. 17 At 
an extraordinary summer sitting, the full Court heard oral argument 
on August 22, 1974, and that same day issued an order denying the 
motion to vacate. 18 Basing its decision on federal and state constitu-
tional grounds,the majority of the Court held that "[i]f the school 
committee at this stage, in reliance on c. 636, attempts to rescind the 
implementation of the Task Force plan, it would constitute State ac-
tion serving to continue segregation in the schools and thus 'signifi-
cantly . . . [involve] the State' in . . . racial discrimination."19 The 
Court found that the committee had taken a number of steps toward 
implementation of the Task Force plan and thus created a new status 
quo. 20 If the preexisting school structure of racial segregation were 
resurrected, the segregation would be state imposed and thus uncon-
stitutional under both the fourteenth amendment to the United States 
Constitution21 and the first and tenth articles of the Declaration of 
Rights of the Massachusetts Constitution.22 
The committee argued that any action it took pursuant to chapter 
636 could not be unconstitutional, because there had been no finding 
that the segregation in Springfield schools was de jure segregation.23 
The majority, however, found that whether the original segregation 
was de facto or de jure was irrelevant since "[s]tate action which would 
cause a return of the preexisting segregation would itself be an act of 
de jure segregation."24 Thus, a state may not undertake a voluntary 
program of desegregation, act under that program to create a new 
13 Springfield III, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2039, 319 N.E.2d at 431. 
14 /d. at 2041-42,319 N.E.2d at 432. 
15 !d. at 2032, 319 N.E.2d at 428. 
16 Id. at 2042, 319 N.E.2d at 432-33. , 
17 /d., 319 N .E.2d at 433. Over the objections of the Massachusetts Board of Educa-
tion, the Attorney General in the name of the Board of Education, supported the mo-
tion to vacate. !d. 
18 !d. at 2043, 319 N .E.2d at 433. 
19 /d. at 2057, 319 N.E.2d at 438, quoting Opinion of the Justices, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
at 1031, 298 N.E.2d at 844. 
20 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2057, 319 N.E.2d at 438. 
21 U.S. CaNST. amend. XIV. See Keyes v. School Dist. No.1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). 
22 MASS. CaNST. pt. I, arts. I & X. 
23 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2049, 319 N.E.2d at 435. 
24 !d. at 2050, 319 N .E.2d at 435. 
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desegregated status quo, and then deliberately provide for a rescision 
of the program and a return to a segregated condition. 
In support of its decision, the majority opinion relied on a long line 
of cases holding the rescision of voluntarily adopted desegregation 
plans unconstitutional, 25 and on a series of decisions starting with 
Reitman v. Mulkey. 26 In Reitman, 21 the United States Supreme Court 
invalidated an amendment to the California constitution that forbade 
any state agency from interfering with the right of any person to sell, 
lease, or rent real estate to whomever he chose. 28 Analyzing the "his-
torical context," "immediate objective," and "ultimate effect" of the 
amendment, the Court in Reitman found that the amendment did not 
put the state in a neutral position, but provided substantial state en-
couragement to acts of private discrimination in violation of the four-
teenth amendment.29 Applying the Reitman analysis in Springfield III, 
the Supreme Judicial Court found that the school committee's pro-
posed application of chapter 636 would similarly be, in effect, an au-
thorization to discriminate. 30 
The majority opinion resolved the constitutional issue without de-
ciding the question whether the Legislature intended chapter 636 to 
affect existing racial balance plans. In concurring, Justice Quirico 
found it unnecessary to reach the constitutional issues, relying on 
rules of statutory construction and of equitable relief to find that 
there was no intent that the statute operate retroactively to affect ex-
isting plans.31 In any event, Justice Quirico concluded, it would not be 
an appropriate exercise of equitable discretion to permit the commit-
tee to revert to its past policy "of questionable constitutionality."32 
After the Court's decision, the racial balance plan was successfully and 
peacefully implemented in Springfield. 
25 !d. at 2048-49, 319 N.E.2d at 435. The Court relied upon the following cases: 
Bradley v. Milliken, 433 F.2d 897, 904 (6th Cir. 1970), 484 F.2d 215 (6th Cir. 1973), 
rev'd on other grounds, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 303 F. Supp. 
289, 295 (D. Colo. 1969), 313 F. Supp. 90 (D. Colo 1970), 445 F.2d 990 (lOth Cir. 
1971), ajj'd in part, modified in part, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); Martin v. Evansville-
Vanderburgh School Corp., 3:47 F. Supp. 816, 820 (S.D. Ind. 1972); Oliver v. 
Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., .346 F. Supp. 766, 780 (W.D. Mich.), ajj'd, 448 F.2d 635 (6th 
Cir. 1971). 
26 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2053-57, 319 N.E.2d at 437-38. The decisions relied upon 
by the Court were: Lee v. Nyquist, 402 U.S. 935 (1971); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 
369 (1967); Opinion of the justices, 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. 545,310 N.E.2d 348; Opinion 
of the Justices, 1973 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1027, 298 N.E.2d 840. 
27 387 u.s. 369 (1967). 
28 /d. at 371. 
29 /d. at 373, 380-81. 
30 1974 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2056-57, 319 N.E.2d at 438. 
31 /d. at 2059-63, 319 N .E.2d at 439-40 (Quirico, J., concurring). 
32 !d. at 2062, 319 N.E.2d at 440. 
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§15.8. Special Education: Chapter 766. The implementation of a 
progressive and comprehensive new special education law, chapter 
766 of the Acts of 1972, in September 1974, marked an attempt by 
the Commonwealth to insure delivery of adequate educational services 
to special needs children. Chapter 766 was a clear break from prior 
programs and was expressly designed to remedy past inadequacies 
and inequities. 1 The Legislature found that "past methods of labeling 
and defining the needs of children have had a stigmatizing effect and 
have caused special education programs to be overly narrow and 
rigid, both in their content and their inclusion and exclusion 
policies."2 
Chapter 766 repealed the profusion of prior special education 
programs3 and funding provisions in favor of a broader, more fluid 
program for identifying and providing adequate programs for chil-
dren with special needs. Local school systems4 are required by Chap-
ter 766 to screen for and identify children with special needs, to diag-
nose and evaluate such needs, to propose an educational program to 
meet such needs, to provide for the implementation of such a pro-
gram, and to make annual assessments of the adequacy of each child's 
program.5 
The statute establishes core evaluation teams composed of teachers, 
doctors, and other specialists to diagnose a child's particular needs. 6 It 
outlines eleven possible categories of educational programs, 7 many of 
which require the services of support personnel. Because of the 
statute's emphasis on "mainstreaming" special needs children into 
regular classes as much as possible, retraining of teachers is often re-
quired. These new procedures and services, at the heart of chapter 
766, represented major "start up" costs to cities and towns. In order 
to assist in meeting these initial costs, the Legislature appropriated 
§15.8 1 Acts of 1972, c. 766, §II, adding G.L. c. 7IB, §§ 1-14. 
2 /d. This stigmatization effect has been challenged as being so detrimental as to raise 
due process issues. Pennsylvania Ass'n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. 
Supp. 279, 293-95 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
3 Acts of 1972, c. 766, § 8. For instance, G.L. c. 69, §§ 28, 28A, 28B, provided for 
"deaf' and hearing-impaired students; G.L. c. 71, § 46, provided for "mentally re-
tarded" children; G.L. c. 71, §§ 46A, 46M, provided for "physically handicapped" chil-
dren; and G.L. c. 69, §§ 32-34, provided for "visually handicapped" children. 
4 Although the responsibility for provision of services rests in most instances on local 
school systems, the statute placed responsibility on the Massachusetts Department of 
Education for education of school-age children in institutions under the control of the 
Departments of Mental Health, Public Health, and Youth Services. G.L. c. 7IB, § 12. 
5 /d. § 3. 
6 /d. 
1 /d. § 2. 
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$26 million for "up front" grants to cities and towns, with specified 
amounts going to each. 8 
§ 15.9. Special Education: Application of Appropriated Funds. 
In Board of Education v. Assessor of Worcester, 1 the Supreme Judicial 
Court held that funds provided to cities and towns under a special 
$26 million disbursement2 could be used only in the implementation 
of new special education programs pursuant to chapter 766. 
By section 24 of chapter 431 of the Acts of 1974, the Legislature 
had authorized the $26 million "in order to meet the costs to be in-
curred by the cities and towns in the implementation of" chapter 766. 
Section 24 further directed: 
The amount granted herein to each city or town shall be held 
as a separate account by the treasurer of such city or town and 
shall be expended by the school committee of such city or town 
for special education programs pursuant to [G.L. c. 71B] without 
further appropriation . . . provided, that where appropriations 
have been made in cities and towns to implement the provisions 
of said [c. 766], the amount by which the grant to each city or 
town as set forth in this section exceeds the amount appropriated 
... shall be applied without further authorization by the board of 
assessors to reduce the current tax rate of such city or town.3 
The Board of Education of the Commonwealth informed local 
school superintendents that the $26 million was to be used to support 
new special education programs over and above these supported dur-
ing the 1973-74 school year.4 Worcester's share of the $26 million "up 
front" grant appropriated by the Legislature was $983,322.5 For the 
1975 fiscal year, the Worcester School Committee had budgeted 
$2,366,000 for special education, of which $268,541 was for new and 
expanded programs to implement chapter 766.6 The Worcester 
School Department directed the town treasurer to deposit the entire 
$983,322 in a separate special education account. 7 The city assessor, 
however, applied the entire $983,322 to reduce the Worcester tax rate 
8 Acts of 1974, c. 431, § 2, line item 7028-0304, § 24. The disbursements were called 
"up front" grants because they constituted, in essence, a beginning-of-the-fiscal-year 
"loan" against the state reimbursements usually made to cities and towns in the follow-
ing fiscal year. The "up front" grant amounts were, thus, deducted from the amount 
due such city or town during the subsequent fiscal year[s] under G.L. c. 58, § 18A. 
§15.9. 1 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2626. 333 N.E.2d 450. 
2 Acts of 1974, c. 431, § 24. 
3 !d. 
4 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2628, 333 N.E.2d at 452. 
5 Acts of 1974, c. 431, § 24. 
6 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2628, 333 N.E.2d at 452. 
7 !d. 
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and the funds were not applied to special education.8 The assessor 
maintained that the pertinent sum was the entire special education 
budget of $2,366,000, which exceeded the $983,322 and therefore al-
lowed him to use Worcester's entire share of the $26 million to reduce 
the tax rate.9 
The issue in the ensuing litigation was whether monies allocated by 
chapter 431 of the Acts of 1974, for implementation of chapter 766, 
"must be spent for new and expanded programs over and above those 
supported in prior years, or whether such monies may be used to re-
duce the tax rate where the total special education budget of a par-
ticular city exceeds the amount so allocated."10 The Supreme Judicial 
Court held that chapter 431 funds are to be spent only for new and 
expanded programs to implement chapter 76611 and ordered the city 
to return $714,781 to the city treasurer for deposit in a separate spe-
cial education account. 12 
The holdmg was based on a three-part analysis: statutory construc-
tion, administrative interpretation, and legislative history. The Court 
rejected the assessor's argument that the phrase "the implementation 
of" chapter 766 included the costs of preexisting programs estab-
lished under laws repealed and replaced by chapter 766.13 Although 
chapter 766 incorporated former provisions for special education 
programs, the Court found that the purpose of the statute was the es-
tablishment of new comprehensive and innovative programs of evalu-
ation and placement of special needs children: "The hallmark of the 
statute is its creativity and the new and expanded programs it pro-
vides. These innovative programs have become synonymous with c. 
766 itself. "14 The Court also gave weight to the consistent administra-
tive interpretation given the statute by the Department of Education, 
which had maintained that the funds appropriated by the Legislature 
were to be used only in support of new special education programs. 15 
Finally, the Court found persuasive a report prepared by the Office 
of the Secretary of Education and used by the Legislature. 16 The re-
port projected that the costs of the initial year of implementation of 
chapter 766 would be $40,000,000, of which $14,000,000 reflected an-
ticipated growth in existing programs. The remaining $26,000,000 
represented additional costs of chapter 766. The Court concluded 
8 Id. 
9 /d. at 2631-32, 333 N.E.2d at 453. 
10 /d. at 2628, 333 N.E.2d at 452. 
11 Id. at 2636, 333 N.E.2d at 454. 
12 /d. 
13 /d. at 2631-32, 333 N.E.2d at 453. 
14 /d. at 2632, 333 N .E.2d at 453. 
15 Id. at 2634, 333 N.E.2d at 454. 
16 /d. at 2634-35, 333 N.E.2d at 454. 
24
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1975 [1975], Art. 19
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1975/iss1/19
420 1975 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §15.10 
that because it was this amount that had been appropriated by the 
Legislature in chapter 431, the Legislature had intended that the 
money be used to establish new special education programs, pursuant 
to chapter 766. 17 The funds, then, were not intended to reimburse 
the towns for maintaining existing programs nor were they meant to 
reduce the tax rate. 18 
§15.10. ·Students' Rights. In Goss v. Lopez, 1 the United States 
Supreme Court established procedures that public schools must follow 
before temporarily suspending a student. Recognizing that, where a 
state has established and maintained a public school system, a student 
has an "entitlement" to public education, the Supreme Court held that 
this interest was protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment.2 The entitlement may not be withdrawn on grounds of 
misconduct unless minimum procedures are followed that are de-
signed to determine whether the misconduct has in fact occurred.3 
The Court held that a student facing a temporary suspension of up 
to tendays must be given oral or written notice of the charges, an ex-
planation of the basis for the accusation, and an opportunity to pres-
ent his or her version of the facts. 4 In addition, unless the student's 
continued presence at the school endangers persons or property or 
threatens disruption of the academic process, the hearing must take 
place before the suspension.5 In emergency situations, the Court held, 
the hearing may be held after the suspension, but must follow as soon 
as practicable.6 Finally, the Court noted that suspensions for more 
than ten days or expulsions may require more formal procedures. 7 
The decision was based on a finding that suspensions infringed 
both "liberty" and "property" interests protected by the fourteenth 
amendment. 8 In addition to the loss of education during the suspen-
sion period, the Court found significant the effect a record of suspen-
sion has on a student's peers and on future educational or employ-
ment opportunities. 9 Such effects were not, in the Court's opinion, 
insubstantial.1 ° 
The requirements established by Goss do not appear to be burden-
some. In most cases, there need be no delay between the time 
17 /d. at 2635-36, 333 N.E.2d at 454. 
18 !d. at 2636, 333 N.E.2d at 454. 
§15.10. I 419 U.S. 565 (1975). 
2 !d. at 574. 
3 !d. 
4 !d. at 58 I. 
5 /d. at 582. 
6 /d. at 582-83. 
7 /d. at 584. 
8 !d. at 574-75. 
9 /d. 
10 /d. at 576. 
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notice is given and the time of the hearing.U Goss does not require 
school officials, in making temporary suspensions, to give the student 
an opportunity to have counsel, to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses, or to call his or her own witnesses, 12 but allows officials to 
do so if they wish. 
§15.11. School Officials: Liability for Damages. During the 
Survey year, the United States Supreme Court determined that public 
school committee members have no absolute immunity from payment 
of damages in dvil rights actions 1 brought against them by students. 
In Wood v. Strickland, 2 the Supreme Court held that where students 
sue school committees of public schools in federal court for violation 
of their constitutional rights, 
a school board member is not immune from liability for damages 
under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known that 
the action he took within his sphere of official responsibility 
would violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or 
if he took the action with the malicious intention to cause a depri-
vation of constitutional rights or other injury to the student. 3 
The case before the Court involved the suspension and eventual 
expulsion of three high school students because they had "spiked" the 
punch at a school-related function. 4 Two of the students sued the 
local school board for damages and injunctive relief, claiming that 
their constitutional rights to due process of law had been infringed.5 
The Supreme Court did not decide whether there had been a viola-
tion of the students' constitutional rights, or whether damages should 
be awarded against the school committee, but sent the case back to the 
lower court to decide these questions in light of certain standards set 
forth in the Wood opinion. 6 
The standard for determining whether school committee members 
in a particular case will be immune from damage suits under section 
1983 of title 42 of the United States Code, the Supreme Court said, 
has elements of both an "objective" and a "subjective" test of good 
faith: 
The official himself must be acting sincerely and with a belief that 
11 !d. at 592. 
12 For a discussion of these requirements in the context of expulsions, see Boykins v. 
Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 492 F.2d 697, 701-02 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 
(1975). 
§ 15.11. 1 Actions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). 
2 420 u.s. 308 (1975). 
3 !d. at 322. 
4 !d. at 311-13. 
5 !d. at 309-10. 
6 !d. at 327. 
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he is doing right, but an act violating a student's constitutional 
rights can be no more justified by ignorance or disregard of set-
tled, indisputable law on the part of one entrusted with supervi-
sion of students' daily lives than by the presence of actual malice. 
To be entitled to a special exemption from the categorical reme-
dial language of § 1983 in a case in which his action violated a 
student's constitutional rights, a school board member ... must be 
held to a standard of conduct based not only on permissible inten-
tion, but also on knowledge of the basic, unquestioned constitu-
tional rights of his charges. 7 
Thus, a school committee member must act "sincerely and with a be-
lief that he is doing right" and must also know "the basic, unques-
tioned rights" of the students. This does not mean, the Court stated, 
that school committees must predict the development of the law of 
students' rights. 8 The Court concluded that an award of damages 
would be proper "only if the school board member has acted with 
such an impermissible motivation or with such disregard of the 
student's clearly established constitutional rights that his action cannot 
reasonably be characterized as being in good faith."9 
Thus, although good faith is available to a school official as a de-
fense in a section 1983 action, the maintenance of good faith is to be 
measured by the official's regard of the student's constitutional 
rights. Four members of the Court dissented from the Court's articu-
lation of this standard, finding that it imposed upon public school of-
ficials a higher standard of care than that to which other officials are 
held. 10 Justice Powell criticized the Court's decision as requiring public 
school officials to have knowledge of what are "unquestioned constitu-
tional rights."11 The correct standard, he continued, was that school 
officials be required to act reasonably and in good faith, in view of the 
attending circumstances. 12 In practice, it is reasonable to read Wood 
together with Goss v. Lopez 13 as establishing that school officials who 
suspend students without following the procedures set forth in Goss 
run a high risk of paying damages to the students, should the stu-
dents choose to sue in federal court for violation of their civil rights. 14 
7 !d. at 321-22. 
8 !d. at 322. 
9 !d. 
10 Id. at 327 (Powell, J., dissenting in part). 
11 !d. at 329. 
12 !d. at 330. 
13 419 U.S. 565 (1975). See discussion of Goss at § 15.10 supra. 
14 Students may sue for damages under state law for unlawful exclusion from public 
school or from "the advantages, privileges or courses of study" of a public school. G.L. 
c. 76, § 16. 
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§15.12. Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965: Title 
III. In School Committee v. Anrig, 1 a case of first impression, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that state edu-
cational agencies passing upon applications from local school systems 
for federal funds pursuant to Title III of the Elementary and Secon-
dary Education Act of 19652 must meticulously follow the procedures 
set forth in the Act and attendant regulations. The court vacated and 
remanded a decision by the Massachusetts Department of Education 
denying Title III funding to a proposal submitted by the town of 
Monson on behalf of sixteen communities constituting the "Monson 
Cooperative," because the procedures developed by that department 
departed from those set forth in the Act.3 
Title III was enacted, in part, "to encourage the adoption of new or 
improved educational ideas, practices, and techniques in elementary 
and secondary schools throughout the nation."4 The Act, as amended 
in 1968,5 provides for distribution of federal funds to local school sys-
tems by the state educational agency-here, the Massachusetts De-
partment of Education. Available funds are allotted to the states by 
the United States Commissioner of Education according to a statutory 
formula. 6 To be eligible for such funds, a state must submit to the 
Commissioner a state plan that complies with the Act and regulations 
promulgated thereunder. 7 Grants may then be made to local educa-
tional agencies pursuant to the state plan. 8 
Although the state selects the programs that will receive the federal 
grants, the selection process must comply with the procedures estab-
lished in Title III and the regulations promulgated pursuant to the 
Act. Title III requires the establishment of a broadly representative 
advisory council to review and make recommendations to the state 
educational agency on each application for a grant. 9 A panel of ex-
perts, who are neither members of the advisory council nor employees 
of the state agency, must also be established to review all grant appli-
cations prior to their disposition. 10 
The First Circuit found that, in attempting to accommodate these 
§15.12. 1 520 F.2d 577 (1st Cir. 1975). 
2 20 u.s.c. §§ 841-47 (1970). 
3 520 F.2d at 581. The proposal was designed to assist the participant communities in 
implementing Acts of 1972, c. 766. 
4 S. REP. No. 726, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1967 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & An. 
NEWS 2730, 2747. The purposes for which grants may be awarded under Title III are 
set forth in 20 U.S.C. § 843 (1970) and 45 C.F.R. §§ 118.21-118.27 (1975). 
5 Pub. L. No. 90-247, Title I,§ 131 Qan. 2, 1968). 
6 20 U.S.C. § 842(a)(2) (1970). 
7 20 U.S.C. § 844a (1970); 45 C.F.R. §§ 118.6-118.20 (1975). 
8 20 U .S.C. § 844 (a) (1970). 
9 20 U.S.C. § 844a(a) (1970). 
10 45 C.F.R. § 118.23(c) (1975). 
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requirements to administrative ease, the state agency adopted proce-
dures that fell short of what the law required.U The state agency had 
established a team of five readers, four employees of the Department 
and one outside expert, as its panel of experts. This panel rated the 
Monson proposal and transmitted it with a negative recommendation 
to the chairman of the advisory council. The chairman submitted to 
the advisory council a list of those proposals approved for recommen-
dation, not including the Monson proposal. The advisory council ap-
proved the list of proposals recommended for funding without discus-
sion of any of the rejected proposals, including the Monson 
proposal. 12 The Monson proposal was thus rejected by the Depart-
ment of Education. Monson sought review, claiming that the proce-
dures used by the state did not comport with the requirements of 
Title 111.13 
The case raised issues of the tolerable limits of administrative in-
terpretation of statutory procedural requirements. The Department of 
Education argued that, because it was the agency charged with ad-
ministration of the program, its interpretation of the procedures re-
quired by the Act should be accorded deference. 14 The First Circuit, 
reviewing the legislative history of Title III, found that the statute 
lodged in the states the authority to disburse federal funds, but that 
that authority was specifically limited, both procedurally and 
substantively. is The court stated that, given those limitations, it would 
be anomalous "to permit the states to develop widely varying interpre-
tations of the very strictures imposed to limit state discretion in the 
use of federal funds."16 
Specifically, the court rejected the argument that the advisory coun-
cil could delegate its function of reviewing and making recommenda-
tions regarding "each application for a grant"17 to its chairman.18 
Such a system defeated the function of the advisory council, which 
was "to introduce a heterogeneous array of perspectives into the grant 
award process."19 The court also rejected the agency's argument that 
the required panel of outside experts means a "roster" of experts 
from which one could be chosen to be on the team of readers. 20 The 
language of the regulatiops and the "Commissioner's determination 
that the diversity of lay interests represented by the advisory council 
11 520 F.2d at 581. 
12 /d. at 579. 
13 /d. at 578. The federal court had jurisdiction under 20 U.S.C. § 844a(f). 
14 520 F.2d at 579. 
15 /d. at 580. 
16 /d. 
17 20 U.S.C. § 844a(a)(2)(C) (1970). 
18 520 F.2d 580. 
19 /d. 
20 /d. 
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should be supplemented by diverse professional assessments"21 both 
required that each application be reviewed by a panel of at least three 
outside experts.22 
§ 15.13. Aid to Parochial Schools: Constitutionality. 1 In Meek v. 
Pittenger, 2 the United States Supreme Court again grappled with the 
question of what public assistance can be provided to nonpublic, 
church-related elementary and secondary schools without violating the 
first amendment. The Court found unconstitutional two Pennsylvania 
statutes providing· for the supplying of instructional materials and 
auxiliary services to parochial schools, 3 but upheld a statute authoriz-
ing textbook loans to pupils of non public schools. 4 
The statutes under consideration in Meek authorized the Common-
wealth of Pennsylvania to: (1) lend directly to the nonpublic schools 
certain instructional materials and equipment; 5 (2) provide in-school 
auxiliary services, such as counseling, testing, psychological services, 
speech and hearing therapy, and services for exceptional or disadvan-
taged children, to children attending nonpublic elementary and sec-
ondary schools; 6 and (3) lend textbooks without charge to children at-
21 !d. at 581. 
22 !d. 
§ 15.13. 1 The author would like to acknowledge the assistance given by Rhoda 
Schneider, Esq., with this section. 
2 421 u.s. 349 (1975). 
3 !d. at 373, 388. Meek v. Pittenger was an appeal from the judgment of a three judge 
district court. That court had upheld all challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania stat-
utes except for the provision providing for the loan of instructional materials, which the 
district court invalidated insofar as the statute provided for the loan of materials that 
could be used for religious purposes. Meek v. Pittenger, 374 F. Supp. 639, 662 (E.D. 
Pa. 1974). Justice Stewart announced the judgment of the Court, which affirmed the 
district court's decision that the textbook loan provision was constitutional, but reversed 
the district court's determination that the provisions providing for auxiliary services and 
instructional material not capable of diversion to sectarian use were also constitutional. 
421 U.S. at 349. Justices Blackmun and Powell joined in Justice Stewart's opinion. In a 
separate opinion, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, concurred 
in the reversal of the district court, but dissented from that portion of Justice Stewart's 
opinion affirming the constitutionality of the textbook provision. Jd. at 373. Justice 
Brennan opined that consideration of the factor of divisive political potential in assess-
ing the constitutionality of the statutes through which the state attempted to aid non-
public schools would compel the conclusion that all of the challenged statutory provi-
sions offend the establishment clause of the first amendment. !d. at 385. Justice Rehn-
quist, joined by Justice White, concurred in the judgment insofar as the textbook loan 
program was upheld, but dissented from the Court's reversal of the district court. Id. at 
387-88. In a separate opinion, Chief Justice Burger also concurred in the affirmance of 
the district court but dissented from the Court's condemnation of the programs provid-
ing equipment and auxiliary services to nonpublic schools, as children attending non-
public schools were thus penalized by being denied secular benefits solely because they 
attend sectarian schools. Jd. at 386-87. 
4 421 U.S. at 373, 385. 
5 Act 195, PA. STAT. ANN., Tit. 24, § 9-972 (1972). 
6 Act 194, PA. STAT. ANN., Tit. 24, § 9-972 (1972). 
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tending nonpublic elementary and secondary schools, so long as the 
books were acceptable for use in any public elementary or secondary 
school in Pennsylvania. 7 
The Court applied a three-part test to determine if the statutes met 
the objectives of the establishment clause. 8 First, the statute in ques-
tion must have a secular legislative purpose. Second, it must have a 
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion. Third, the 
statute and its administration must avoid excessive government en-
tanglement with religion. 9 A statute that fails any one of these tests is 
unconstitutional. 
In Meek, the Court acknowledged that the Pennsylvania statutes had 
a secular legislative purpose: the extension of certain educational ben-
efits to all schoolchildren, whether attending public or nonpublic 
schools. 10 Nonetheless, in its analysis of the three main provisions of 
the statute, the Court determined that two of the provisions failed the 
two other parts of the establishment clause test. 
The provision of the statute allowing for the direct loan of instruc-
tional materials and equipment to nonpublic schools was struck down 
on the grounds that it had the direct effect of advancing religion.U 
The Court reasoned that the aid involved was substantial, not inciden-
tal, and it flowed directly to the nonpublic schools themselves, most of 
which were church-related or rel!giously affiliated. 12 
The "auxiliary services" provision of the statute was struck down on 
the grounds that it created an excessive entanglement between the 
state and religion, because the services were to be provided by public 
school personnel on the. premises of the non public school. 13 The 
Court reasoned that excessive entanglement in the affairs of the re-
ligious school would be required for Pennsylvania to be certain, as it 
must be under the first amendment, that the personnel did not in any 
way advance the religious mission of the church-related schools in 
which they provided services. 14 This provision also violated the Con-
stitution: because annual appropriations funded the program, the 
provision offered "opportunities for political fragmentation and divi-
sion along religious lines.':15 
Only the textbook loan provision of the statute was upheld by the 
Court, on the grounds that it merely made available to all children the 
7 Act 195, PA. STAT. ANN., Tit. 24, § 9-972 (1972). 
8 421 U.S. at 358. See Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 772-73 
'(1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612-13 (1971). 
9 421 U.S. at 358. 
10 !d. at 359, 363, 368. 
11 /d. at 366. 
12 /d. 
13 /d. at 370-71. 
14 /d. at 372. 
15 /d. 
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benefits of a general program to lend secular schoolbooks to all chil-
dren free of charge. 16 In addition, the Court noted that no funds or 
books would be furnished to parochial schools themselves; the finan-
cial benefit would be to parents and children, not to the nonpublic 
schoolsY For these reasons, the Court declared the textbook loan 
program-essentially the same as that upheld in Board rif Education v. 
Allen 18 -constitutional.19 
The Meek decision may raise questions as to the constitutionality of 
certain federal programs that are extended to students in nonpublic 
schools. A number of federal programs of aid to education, such as 
Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,20 re-
quire that eligible students in nonpublic schools receive "comparable" 
services to those made available to eligible students in public schools. 21 
The constitutionality of such a requirement has not yet been decided 
by the United States Supreme Court: in Wheeler v. Barrera, 22 the Court 
discussed some of the issues involved but concluded that the first 
amendment issues raised were nqt timely. 
Effect of Meek on chapter 766. The provision of special education 
services to parochial school students in Massachusetts pursuant to 
chapter 76623 and the regulations promulgated thereunder appears 
not to violate the constitutional standards enunciated in Meek. A two-
part analysis supports this conclusion. 
First, the special education services provided to any child with spe-
cial needs under the first four program prototypes (regular education 
program with modifications, regular education program with no more 
than 25 percent time out, regular education program with no more 
than 60 percent time out, and substantially separate program) must 
under the Regulations for the Implementation of Chapter 766, be 
provided within public school regular education facilities. 24 Thus, for 
children in these program prototypes, special education services 
under chapter 766 may not be provided within a nonpublic school. 
This provision distinguishes the Massachusetts statute from the "aux-
16 I d. at 360. 
17 /d. at 361. 
18 392 u.s. 236 ( 1968). 
19 421 U.S. at 362. The applicability of this section of the decision in Meek v. Pittenger 
to the Massachusetts textbook loan statute (Acts of 1973, c. 1196, G.L. c. 71, § 48) was 
discussed by Attorney General Francis X. Bellotti in a recent Advisory Opinion to 
Commissioner Gregory R. Anrig (June 12, 1975). The Opinion of the Attorney General 
concluded that chapter 1196 is constitutional. Id. at 7, 10. 
20 20 U .S.C. § 241a et seq. ( 1970). 
21 See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 116.19(b) (1975), promulgated pursuant to 20 U.S.C. §242(b) 
(1970). 
22 417 u.s. 402 (1974). 
23 See discussion of chapter 766 in § 15.8 supra. 
24 Regs. for the Implementation of Chapter 766 ,II, 502.1(e),502.2(c), 502.3, 502.4(e) 
(Ma~s. Dept. of Educ., 1975) [hereinafter cited as C. 766 Regs.]. 
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iliary services" provision of the Pennsylvania statute, which the Court 
struck down on the grounds of excessive entanglement largely be-
cause the services were to be provided on the premises of the nonpub-
lic school. 25 
Although it is true that, under the program prototypes for day 
schools and residential schools,26 services may be provided to children 
with special needs within a nonpublic school, such placement will 
occur only when the public school system that is legally responsible 
for the provision of special education cannot provide a program meet-
ing a child's special needs. The chapter 766 programs are thus distin-
guishable from the "auxiliary services" provision struck down in Meek. 
In addition, where a child must be placed in a nonpublic school, such 
placement is in the nature of a contract for services, and does not in-
volve the same excessive entanglement as did the Pennsylvania 
statute.27 In a recent decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of a similar provision in the Wisconsin special 
education law providing for the placement of special needs children 
in private schools where local public educational services were 
inadequate.28 
Secondly, the Supreme Court in Meek v. Pittenger expressly re-
frained from ruling on the authority of the state to enact a com-
prehensive program to make free special education services available 
to all students, whether they attend public or nonpublic schools.29 
Thus, the constitutional\ty of a comprehensive special education law 
such as chapter 766 was not decided by the Court. There are indica-
tions in the decision, however, that a law such as chapter 766, particu-
larly with the constitutional safeguards that are built into the statute 
and regulations, would be sustained by the Court even though it 
makes some services available to students attending nonpublic schools. 
For example, the Court said: 
It is, of course, true that as part of general legislation made avail-
able to all students, a State may include church-related schools in 
programs providing bus .transportation, school lunches, and public 
health facilities -secular and nonideological services unrelated to 
the primary, religious-oriented educational function of the sec-
tarian school. The indirect and incidental benefits to church-
related schools from those programs do not offend the constitu-
tional prohibition against establishment of religion.30 
25 421 U.S. at 371. 
28 C. 766 Regs., supra note 24, f f 502.5, 502.6. 
27 421 U.S. at 372. 
28 State ex rel. Warren v. Nusbaum, 64 Wis. 2d 314, 219 N.W.2d 577 (1974). 
29 421 U.S. at 368 n.17. 
30 /d. at 364-65. 
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Similarly, the Court noted that the provision of the Pennsylvania 
statute providing for diagnostic speech and hearing services "seems to 
fall within that class of general welfare services for children that may 
be provided by the State regardless of the incidental benefit that ac-
crues to church-related schools."31 
It is likely that special education services provided to children with 
special needs in accordance with the provisions of chapter 766 and its 
regulations would be viewed by the Court as "general welfare serv-
ices" that are secular, nonideological, and "unrelated to the primary, 
religious-oriented educational function of the sectarian school," and 
thus would be constitutional. 
§15.14. Legislation. In a Legislature largely concerned with the 
state budget, few major pieces of educational legislation were passed. 
Significant legislation that would have altered the state school financ-
ing system, 1 that would have placed students on school committees, 2 
and that would have provided for metropolitan school integration 
programs3 had not, by early October, 1975, received favorable action. 
The Legislature did amend various sections of chapter 71 of the 
General Laws to accord faculty of public schools greater procedural 
protections and benefits. Chapter 199 of the Acts of 197 5 extended to 
assistant principals the procedural requirements of section 42A re-
garding demotion of principals and supervisors, and defined "demo-
tion" to include reduction of salary contrary to the provisions of sec-
tion 43 and transfers without a teacher's consent to nontenured posi-
tions. Chapter 316 of the Acts of 197 5 amended the provision in sec-
tion 42D allowing a teacher to be suspended by reducing the period 
of suspension from seven days to five days. Chapter 349 of the Acts 
of 1975 extended to school nurses the benefits of section 41A, which 
allows leaves of absence for career enhancement to certain school per-
sonnel. Finally, chapter 33 7 of the Acts of 197 5 extended to principals 
the provisions of section 43A for judicial review of dismissals and de-
motions of teachers and superintendents, and included removal from 
a position as a reviewable action. Chapter 337 also altered the lan-
guage of section 43A concerning the scope of review from "de novo" 
hearings to "[t]he court ... shall hear witnesses, review such action, 
and determine whether or not upon all the evidence such action was 
justifiable." 
Several changes were made in the provisions of chapter 71 that 
31 /d. at 371 n.21. This provision, however, fell with the invalidation of the auxiliary 
services statute, because the Court discerned no intent that the Legislature would have 
passed the law solely to provide for the speech and hearing services. /d. 
§15.14. 1 1975 Session, House No. 128. 
2 1975 Session, House No. 134. 
3 See, e.g., the Daly-Sullivan Bill, 1975 Session, House No. 2439. 
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concern students. The sections allowing private schools students to ob-
tain public school health services.:.._section 57 -'-and textbooks 
-section 48-were limited by chapters 480 and 562, respectively, of 
the Acts of 1975, to those students attending private schools that do 
not discriminate in entrance requirements on the basis of race or 
color. In addition, section 13, which requires the teaching of high 
school courses at the request of twenty students and parents, was 
liberalized by chapter 305 of the Acts of 1975: a course may now be 
offered at the request of parents of twenty pupils or a number of 
pupils equivalent to 5 percent of the high school enrollment, 
whichever is less.4 Finally, chapter 371 of the Acts of 1975 added sec-
tion 340 to chapter 71, establishing parent advisory committees to 
school committees on sex education courses. 
Two new statutes affected collaboratives and a third was addressed 
to regional school aid. Chapter 323 of the Acts of 1975 amended sec-
tion 4E of chapter 40 of the General Laws to allow school committees 
to designate a person other than a school committee member-as 
previously required-to sit on the educational collaborative board. 
Chapter 323 also amended section 4E to change the position of col-
laborative treasurer from being the treasurer of the largest town in 
the collaborative to an elected position. The second statute, chapter 
436 of the Acts of 1975, amended section 56 of chapter 41 of the 
General Laws to allow school committees participating in regional 
school district collaboratives to prepay tuition to the collaborative. 5 
Finally, a corrective statute, chapter 436 of the Acts of 197 5, was 
enacted to ensure that all regional school districts would get some 
state aid. 
4 In a June, 1975 decision, the Supreme Judicial Court held that a school committee 
was obliged to offer a driver education course under this statute. Johnson v. School 
Comm., 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2018, 330 N.E.2d 478. 
5 On its face, the statute appears to be limited to those collaboratives involving re-
gional school districts. 
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